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ABSTRACT 
The wage rate in s casual labour market, paddy field labour, 
bminated from a reduced form version of a supply and demand 
'rlsl after incorporating 1i teracy, caste and the degree of 
donisation in the structural equations. The empfrical evfdence 
dews that the degree of uniartivation is the only factor that 
dfects the wage rates in one of the most important labour 
u)rets in Kerala. The adjustment of paddy output and its 
mponents, area and yield, to wage increase is brought out by 
mparativa static enalysis of profit function. The estimation of 
Ybwrdel from district ievef d a t a  provides an explanation for 
bobserved decline in output and area and increase in the yield 
cl paddy since 1975/76. 
' M s  article is a substantially revised version of the f frst 
Cut of the paper presented at the t.wenty-eighth Indian 
bnometric Conference held in Ra3a Rammohunyur , Darjeeling , West 
h g a i  I;n October 29-31, 1991. The revision has benefitted from 
tbe comments of A.Vai dyanathan, Mukesh Esw aran, B.G. Kumar and 
kidul  Espan. The suggestions of a . ~  internal referee was also 
weful for sharpening the ideas further. T.ne usual disclaimers 
Q P ~ .  
Wage ficterminatior; ir: 3 Casual Labour Narket: 
The Case of Padev F i e l d  Laba~r in Serals 
e d*tern?in:int..; c.1' i t  t a r :  W T \ ~ C :  rates hav6 heen 
bi te?  quite exiensivsiy i r i  Ind.ian zgricalture. Although 
mier on tile ~ f f  i:ct.s c;r tr?C;~1 2n:~nrci: i~ en t.he industrial wage 
lrtti .re available. k t -  is a d  3r.y zimiiar work on the 
nrcl 'abuur murkc-i. ; ri i ttci:  2 .  i :. h:,r; 3etS:rt s i n g l e d  o u t  as one of 
&c::.t imy)cr+,ant.. C.qr:?..;)rs. r ' I  de+,arn,in%ticrrt c,f agricultural 
~lt r.ites ~ r r  Ke^ rai n i  . i\li!,* :c t t c m j * t .  t.c: st.udy the iwact of trade 
~ O L  on r t ~ r  s.%t?r; i fi e r n  has been sev~rely 
bd~:f:pped h y  r.hc ut tavj i i~ ! ' r*~:  r t y  t2.f trade  U ~ I . ~ O R  membership anon42 
v 9c 2rr icu l turs l  ~ r ~ - : r i r t ~ ~ .  : t :?cent ly  some r-stlnlates arc? ~ v r t i l e b l t  
* 
r t!.. tr.s,ie u n i t i n  rnc~ti-rsi.;\s 3,; a rasuit of thc study on rurai 
ml~r.nrian ~ t r u c ~ l a s  i n  h e r a l s s .  The present paper mnwt,c. an 
ittm:: to cwlei l.he impact of trade unionism on the formatten 
d w:e3 m t a s  i?sl?.c the abave 4af;a. irc the process. tho t a w r  
aIsc .tevelofrs an analytical frame work to sxplafn the increase irr 
Irnd yield i n  the wake of stagnation in paddy productiori. 
survey on the literature S U ~ ~ ~ R ~ S  thaf twc ~chools of 
Mwg'?t arc? predominant i n  the characterisation of t h e  I n, ; i sn  
labour nrarkets. h i e  tho first approach ertprjasises 
rtructural factors ntich ss institut.itrns, customs, re). isiort ;.t.c. 
ilt!trt determ~nation of wage rates. t second one tr las  tco 
crplain the wage rates in terms of demana for and supvl y of 
curs. For t h e  prevent  tuialysis.  we have cho5an %he 3econd 
1 
approach because of its advantages for t e s t ing  varfous hypothesir 
on the factors that influence waga rates in rural lahur market. 
The limitations of %he method will be discussed later. 
The o u t l i n e  of the pawr is as follows. In sec%ion 1, 
reduced form equatfon of the wage rate is derived from the 
structural equation' of supply of and demand for labour.  The 
model is eotiracrt.ctd from cluas ocH,?.ton data. Section i I shows 
the impact oS cost ascalatfon on aeraago a1 1 w ~ t . I o n  and outgut 
in the absence of technical change. It also est1aat.s~ tho 
relationship hotween wage r a k e ,  y i e ld  and output as a rc-sttlt td 
the cosf. asca In+.tnn t , - i  n& firosn 3et: t Ifin awl tinosariea dstu  . 
Soution f 
1.1 Reviaw of Theory 
There are four maJor theories on wage determination t h a t  u u  
' supply and demand f r-work: ( 1 i c3assf cal Oaaapatit ivla m o i s l ;  (2) 
insider-otl l irfer theory; ( 3  1 efficiency wa#e theory; and (4) 
implicit cooperation theory'. 
In tho compatf tive m o d e l ,  the w a g e  rates a m .  Aetc* rmi  n-4, 
just  l i k e  In any other carwtodity ,  on the bast's of stlppiy a d  
demand factors. In such a model, the wage rates clear ti15 markat, 
in the sense tbat no Involuntary unemployment exists. Tk 
prediction of the model is inconsi3tent with tha wicleaprd 
invclluntary unompfoyment in  tbe rural areas. " Remaining thra( 
dels were constructed to reconcile the supply-demand model of 
rge de?zminztian w i t h  involuntary employment- 
The ef5iziency wage models are based on the following twin 
m p t i a n s :  ( 1 ) the employers s a t  the wage rates arid they have 
mc markef powex to do so; (2) the firms .lack the perfect 
h l e d g e  cf the productivity of eech -of its workers5 . Moreover, 
b. firms believe that the wage rate has positive effect on 
pductivity snd negative effect orr average labour cost  per time 
.it. Theref are, firns set higher wages as a screenircg devise 
frr recrui tin# best workers and provide incentive for incumbent 
rrkers to ~2 in more effort in the production process. This 
hplies that the wage r a t e  st the margin will be more than the 
Wrtunity c s s t  af labour. Such a market is characterised by 
hluntary  unemployment. Although the model explains the 
&wed ciifferences in %he wage rates of the same type of labour 
ir the i n d u s t r i a l  sector, . it fa i l s  to provide a satisfactory 
clplanaticns for the near-uniform wage rates existing in the 
nral latoc-r. ;v,arket f o x  a g;tven task in a given locality ( O s m a n i ,  
WB8: 4 ) .  %+ace, the modal hns very limited use in the present 
antext. 
bath tne theories . a9 f iciency wage and insider-outsider, 
me that  it, 1s the market power in the wage sett ing that 
mlts iri the wags rates above the market-clearing wage rates. 
Lbdif ierence  is tha assumption on the market power of the 
agents. Xn the efficiency wage rlrodel the market power rests w i t h  
the employers while in the  insider-outsider with tka incumbent 
.Labourers. The insider-outsider model classifies the labourem 
into mutually exclusive groups; (I) the irjsidcrs who a n  
employed; (2) the oatsiders who art, anemplopcd. The Insidarr 
exercise their power w i t h i n  tlte fi-rm ta extract  a portion of t he  
rent f r o m  the employara6. As a result, the wage rates  are above 
tl-te market clearing wage rates whicil result in unemplomnt7. 
Ac~erlof (1991) has hailed the theory as the best amone th. 
models on unemployment with microfoundation that have bppearrl 
during the l a s t  twenty years. The main drawback of the model is 
its inability, like the efficiency wage model, to explain tk 
existence of  near-uniform wage rate for s qiven task in a s i v n  
locality in the rural awtor. On the contrary, the impl i c i t  
cooperation theory predicts uniform wage rates in eqoflibritm 
within the supply and demand framework. 
The theory of implicit cooteration assumes that the wage 
rate is the outcome of individual choice based on strataeic 
considerations (6sman.t ., 9 . i ? ~  ,this story, the  wage rate i r  
based on .the probabiiity of employment which depends verynuch mr 
the interaczion of slipply of and denand for labour. Moreover, 
th* s t r a t e g i c  khnviour of the workers in setting the dai ly  w w  
rate  has the  ?roperties 02 a repeatad non-cooperative game. The 
agcn+,s have, i t  scsn a game.- some incentive for implicit 
cooperation of a self-enforciw nature in sattfng the wage rmt.. 
the supply and demand conditions prevai ling in the market, 
uchworkcr sets his wage rate so as to maxfmise h i s  expected 
m-off. The most important point is that the quoted wage rate 
b e n d s  an %he wage rates demanded by other workers. The 
tluilibriam wage rate is established when it does not pay tc 
w i s e  the bid. The equilibrium wage rate based on the reactions 
d others is the usual Nash-equilibrium in the game-theorat~c 
literature. Naturally the equilibrf um wage rate is hl.gh.-r than 
the wage rate under competitive equilibrium. The dir ' f  erence in 
tk wage rates explains the extent of involuntary anc.nplovncn t . 
Although, the game--thmrat i c approach eh~racterises t,he 
Wr-uniform w a g e  rates in a given locality batter than the other 
h e  models, it becoaes very difficult, if not impossible, to 
test the inf iuence of non-economic factors orr wage f . mation 
rlthin the implicit cooperation theory. Theref ore. we have 
&sen the competitive model. like Bardha ( 1984 ) and Binswanger 
d Roser:weig (1984 j ,  on the assumption that tne model 
lrpmximates the rural labour market in indie. This assumption 
irvaiia mere in Keraia than elsewhere in India due to the 
Increasing sholrtztge of labour for agricultural operations in 
brala. 
1.2 Wage Formation: Supply and Demand Model 
The simplest formulation of the supply and demand model is 
teassume that it depends orily on its price. But it is well 
known that such a syste~ of equations is not identified u n 1 . x ~  we 
impse same restrictions on the. equations. h e  methad of 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  'is to include additfane! -~ariables that  affect 
only the-demand function but not. s2pply end vice versa. L e t  us 
examine such factors for the specificstion. ~ i a k s  il!3&3j has 
snown that labour demand, muer cost mininie;l.oq behaviodr, Its 
determined by the relationshi3 between productivity art3 wage 
r e .  Therefore, the strcctural equation of demand for labour 
should depend on the Isbcjur productivity. Whiie e x ~ l a i n i a g  t ha  
i n t e r - d i s t r i c t  variability i n  tks  ~gricalturai wego rates, Ha3 
has hgpbtnemlssd -?&at higher land-man ratio in a district cbn put 
upward pressers ol? the wage ratas8. Tiis would imply that land-  
%an rat io  is s .fsctcr that affects the demand for labour. The 
structural equation of the demana for labocr becomes: 
i.l) 2 = uo + etW + ~ 2 x 1  + a3Ka (ar <a, a>@, crs>B) 
where D. the demand for labour; W ,  the wage r a t e  ; XI , 
the labour productivity; snd &, the land-man ratio. 
The scgply side, on the other hand, depends on thr 
preference naxfmizatisn of the wcrkers gfven their cho;ice bet-08 
incame w d  leisure. I n  addition to the wage rate, the following 
non-economic f aclcrra f nf luence the supply of labour in Kerala. 
Although the state has the hfghsst unemployment rate in India, it 
has no effect on the wage rate of paddy labour since the m a j o r i t y  
of them are educated urtemployed and they are (rhply not available 
4e to socf a l  sti grim at-. to such labaur. As a m t  them? 
airts shortade of labour slong with high unsaaplmwnt in Rerala 
b i n g  tba peak season2 of agricuitural activities. Recent 
rklicsta the educated unempLoped also show that the uneaplayed 
dth educational backmound of high school and above do not 
m a h y  prefer to work as a paddy f i e l d  labour. This wauld 
4 1 ~  illat high illitsracy rate amone: the agriet, 1 . t t r r s  l labaur 
fm has a depressfng effect on the wage r a t e .  If. !ras  be;^ 
that the main aoatrrs of anpp1.y + n  t.h+s Irrhotar markc-., 
iron socially backward clesses especially f m m  the sc'necu~ed 
aztt ISC) and scheduled tribe (ST j populations. Therefere, the 
popcrtion of tha i l  l Sterate..r urarsne , n e h w  4 c ? q . . r t ~  en? r : t r ~ ) ? ~ t  164 
tribe laimur force has a pojitive inpact 02 the  lalour suuply. 
i t  is well known that the labour f e x e  Ln Kercln is 
nlrtivelr well oreanisad. Themfcra the Sargrtiniaa Wer of the 
k b ~ r  f9rce is higher in Rarala than elsewhere- ia In2i~. This 
mid imply that supply of la3cur fs eL30 1r~i:uanced b y  the 
kwr! of unionisstion. T h e  relationship between t h e  supply of 
lrkur and t h e  de-a of unianlsaticrn is not s t r a ~ g h t  forward. It 
1: ertablished indtractLy in the follmving way.  The r e d l  wage 
(natnal -/cost of l iv ing index) :a usuaiiy assumed to be 
)(sitivelj related to supply of labour in the literature (hl, 
1989; p.145). The real wage rate is high ~f thg degree of 
anioi~tsatfon is high and lo), if it. is low. T t r i s  would imply +Aat 
tLc dirgree af unfonisatfon has a poslt lve impact Gn the 'labour 
sup2?ly* The structural equation of supply of labour is given by 
(2)  B = B e  + 41W +Pax4 (PI > 0; P t  > @ : @ a  >0) 
where S, the supply of labour; W, tkte wwe rate; X3 , th* 
degree of unionisation; and X I ,  proportian of illiterates among 
the SC and ST agricultural labour force. 
The reduced form aquation'of tba wage rate under equilibrium i r  
given below: 
Pe -a@ 612 u3 
where ze = -. m = -  zt = -. 
. an -01 Dl-1 - PI -1 
and u, atochaatic error ten.  
The source of d a t a  and t;he ampirica2 resu l t s  are given 
below. 
1.2 empfrical Results 
The astimatfon of the laode1 is dfctsted purely by tba 
availability of data, a problem wMeh is common in applied wrk.  
The d i s t r f c t  l e v e l  data on lubommr lor- A r e  available only in a 
Census Snl-vap. Themfore, w l a  have infomation for the m m  
JSil, 19?1 and 1981. 3ut  tnere is no data on trade union 
mkrzhip for the year 1962 (Kannan, 1988: Table 6.8). Thia 
u r z  that w heve d i s t r i c t  level observations for only two 
rurs, 1371 and 19t3i. 
'iXe var iab les  used for the estimation are defined as follows. 
Uthou,* wage rates of both male &d female paddy f i e l d  w o r k e r s  
?re available. the female wage rates are available only from 1372 
mrcs. Therefore, t h e  w a g e  rates and the related var inb icz  in 
'k model are. as far is possible, related So ma ie 'rctbo'rr on!.y. 
estimate on .labour productivity, the main aetemir~ant of t h e  
i#ad for labour, is svailable neither at t h e  d i s t r i c t  Level n9r 
rt the sSatc i e v e l .  The reason baing t h e  absence of :-:fi.v reif able 
ik a the actuai l a t o w  force ~ p l o y e d  i r: paddy production. 
berefore, land pf.oductivit5- is csually rtxed ds 2 proxy for ' 
irkor productivity (Acharya, 1992 ) . Thia assumes t r~at  t,kq ;?ir~d-- 
labour ratio is constant acroas +;ha d i s t r i l ~ ~ t ~  . .?he vaj i t l )  r.s of 
h cssmption is not possible to vcrif 5.. Tg overcme the 
milern, we have t eken total achedcled caste and scvlaciuied t r i b e  
mcultural male labour for- rss sc astinrate of la!mtlr emyloped 
IB )adCy productfonl a .  The degrea of unionisatior~ is aafined as 
*h ratio,# the  number of &bars in lisrslieka Sta~a ihctzhilali 
hi@.? (c~ntmlled .by zhe Harxisr. C c ~ m m t ~ n i s t  Party 1 to total 
qtiaultural labour force. The break-up c~14 tile memberchip by sex 
i 3  not available. Themf ore ,  ths clsgrea .sf unitmi sz t 19n includes 
kth the sexes. The frnpact of education or, the wage rate f s 
captured by the ratio of male i2lfteratas to the total scheduled 
0 
caste and scheduled tr lbe male agricultural workers. The 
estimated equst5on i n  logaritlmic variables is given belowll. 
RZ=W.76, D-W = 1.92, n = 18 
me degree of unionisation ia the only ~fgniflcant veriaole 
t h t  influences the wage rates of paddy f i e l d  labour In the post 
land reform r o d .  The resul t  seems to suegent that. t.hs caste 
and educatxon that keep t h e  w w e s  deprassad hava no ~ n f l u e ~ c e  i~ 
the determination of wages once t h e  labour i s  unlcniscd. The 
findings, however, naeil t o  be substantiatad wL Lh microlaw1 
study . 
Since the wages aetannined by, supply factors e l y  , the 
behavfour of the farmers need s caref u i  analysis. '?his i a dealt 
w i t h  in the next sectim. 
2.1 Wage Effect an Output ,  A r e a  and Yield of Paddy 
2.1 .1  Profit Function Approach 
The ad3ustnwnt of output an2 its components, area and y i d  
to change in input price is examined b l o w  usjng c c m y r r r t l V  
statiaa analysis of profit funct lon (Chambers .  1988; pp.126-39) 
:u 
krader the prof it function 
where p: price of oatput: 
c: output; w: the v e Y o r  of input prices; 
c(w,oj: the mininum m s t  function for the  
rmluction of output , o, given tbct input 
prices. 
From h'otdlirrg lemma, the profit maximisJne: Itvel of output 
ad tihe correspondirzg factor demand for ith input 'can be obtained 
fm part ia l  d iPf  erentiatior- cf the pr6f it fun&ian: 
Ltt. the it!! input be labour.  The ad justmnt  of output to change 
ir the wags rats is a b t d n e d  by differentiating ( 5 )  with respect 
te K, , the wage r a t e .  
= ~ _ A ( P ,  a) (symmetry of derivatives) 
.ophwt 
= - &r ip,w) (Shepherd's lemma) 
6~ 
but the factor demand and the conditianai demand for labour 
must be the same at the profit maximising level of output. 
(82  xi ( p . w )  = x! (n . i . ip .wj )  
Differentiating ( 8 )  w i ~ k  respect *to p, we have 
Subs t i tu t ing  ( 9 j  in ( 7 ) .  
Since t he  slope 02 %he s u p p l y  curve is positive, it is clear that 
the output adjostn!er:-L ko wage change is opposite to the change i n  
Lhe labour  dcmcnd bne to change in output. But the demand fer 
labour due .to crutput change is related to nargfnal cost f r t  t h e  
following way. 
Csing Shepherd's lemme 
Equation (11) shows that derivative of labour demand w i t h  
respect to output depends on nature of change' in the rnarg1n.l 
cost due t c i  wage change, 'Unf a r t ~ a t e l y ,  .the effect on aargir:rl 
cost is not unique since it depends on w h e t h e r  the labour i . r r p t  
12 
18 rcrmal or regressive. r our case, the labour is a normal 
bt. Therefore. %he marginal cost and the  wage rate change in 
@same direction. Frcs (10) and (11). it can be concluded that' 
b o u t p u t  declines as wage increases. Let us examine the impact 
d rm rates on area and yield, the t w o  components of output. 
The components are derived fxlom the multiplicative formulc. 
(12) 0 = l.o/l 
Htfersntiatinq (12) with respect to the wage rat.& and 
a)ressing in terms of elasticities. 
(13) Eo =El + E y  
where el: wne4 el n d , i * t i  by 4.r.C inn4; 
Ey: w a g e  elasticity of yield;  
fa : wage elasticity of. ou.tput . 
huation (13) moans that the o u t p u t  e I ~ ~ t . i c . i + . y  fie p&dy 3 . 3  
ma1 to  the sum of land and yield elss+,icl tg. Le.3 us exam+ua the 
mid& evidence on output, area and y ie ld  acjuatmsnt tc, W Q ~ -  
Imease. 
2.1.2 Estimation 
The elasticities w e r e  estimated from the follawfng double 
(14a) In W = pa + (31 In, 0 + p2 In Y + e 
(14b) l n W = t e + t ~  l n O + z z  I R A  + e  
( 14c j InW = a e  +a1 I n A + a z  In Y + e  
where W,  the wage rate of paddy filed male labour: 0. 
output of psddy; Y, the y i a l d  of paddy; A ,  acreage cnder paddy; 
and e, the stochastic error term. 
The equations, a - 14c, were estimated for each of the 
nine  districts in Irlerala for the period, 1975/76 - 06/87, during 
which the paddy r i has r--ei c.r.a cccl a d ramat,ic! becl i.0 
(Kennsn and Pushpangaden, 1896) .  If the errors were  
autocorreiated f r o m  Ourbin - Watson t e s t ,  then ~ochrant  -0muk.i 
method (CORC) was  used for its correction. if CORC f a i l e d  to (ti- 
any siunif i cmt  resuit, then f l rst dif f eri:nce versions of' 14r. 
14b and 14c were estimated. I f  .the equations w e r e  s t i l l  not 
g i v i n g  any theoretically and statist2cally corrrect estimates, 
then simple double logarithmic functions of the followiY 
specifications, 15a-15c. w e r e  estimated. 
( 1 5 ~ )  i n Y = a e  +a1 I n W + e  
The estimated equations are given in Appendix and the resulti4 
elasticities12 in Table 1- 
r )  i cb le  I .  Wag& Elssticisy 02 C)utpu+,, Area and Yield of paddy 
(1275/76-58/87) 
District Wage Elasticity of 
Area Yield Output 
(1 j (2)  ( I )  + (2) 
K~rala -0 .M B. 19 
- 
Source: Table: 1 in Appendix. 
Tne e.)ast.irrt Gy &.st.imat.cs .show t.hnt. +.he: n~~+.pait. &el  i nci i s due 
c LI+ i nr:ru?s.se i n  the w a g e  rates i n  all the d i ~  tr5cts ir! Kerizla. 
Tk <ri~tput adjustment in two distrf c t s ,  Quilon and Kc,::h ikade. f 3 
I rre than cr equal to the prupctrtj on.sl. i ucrease i r ~  wage rates. 
Theeffect of wage rate on ou igut  is mnximunl in cb;uiJor. followed 
b Kozhikode and the least i n  Kottaysm fallawed 3y Pslgnat. Since 
tbe intercept term is significant in almost a i l  the equetions the 
ucge rates aro f nf Auenced by r'ac+ors other than the level of 
)reduction. The eztfmation clearly shr~ws that  declica in paddy 
yrduction is widespread in Kerala and the main scrurce is due to 
rnz declrne.  kt: the same tir~~e the yielci  has shown a positive 
ircreaze everjwhere i n  Kerala. In fact. t.he districts with 
M&st area c!ecline, Qirilcrn and Kozhikadt?, have registered the 
bithest yield increase. Similarly the lowest yield increase has 
rlsc, bean f rr the districts w i t h  lowest area decline under paddy. 
In other words, tbmmmhta a negative association between am. 
and yield adjustment to wmge increase during tne stagnation 
period. This finding needs an explanation which is given below. 
The above analysis shows that wege rates of paddy f i e l d  
labeur are determined by supply considera%ions only. In fact the 
wage rates of paddy. f i e l d  labour, both product wag* and real 
wage, have growu very rapidly relative 30 productivityla. 11 
such a s i t u a t i c , n .  c o s t  m i n i m i  .s5 np f n z ' m ~ ~ .  r?<tn Id ~ u b ~ f . ' ~ t u t e  away 
t h e  expensive in2dt .  but such cost r e d u c i  r,g t . s r?rnhl .Og~,  
mechanical and biological, is not easily evatlable with it5 
critf cal complementary jnyuts like irrleat,ion in Kerala. This 
may be '9 reason for dacliue i t  ares under !3YV paddy in Karala. 
Mc~reover, there is very l i t t le  Lnr.efii ive for farmers to deve 10, 
indigertouj. tacl~nology because of tne  public na+,ure of such 
investment. As s result, tho cost of production increases 
proportionetely wit?: incrssse in wage rates. Under such 
b 
technological constr&lnts, the  observed behaviour of area and 
y i e l d  is  the resuit cf the cost sinimising behaviour of th. 
farmers as  demonstrated below1 4 .  
2 2  figure 1. the output is measured along the x-axis and the 
unit cosl; and p r i c e  oi paddy along the y- t lx is:  The rnargind 
producers and thelr unit cost  of production are plotted a t  the 
beginning of the x-axis. As a z.esul.t ,  the difference between the 
. .  . 
. . 
price and unit cost is t n e  rental value of the' paddy l a n d .  The 
ac of f .miip iabacr ia %he production of paddy creates 
mmptua: aififcuities I n  the calculation of u n i t  cost .  If the 
mss is only .paid auk cost, then u n i t  cost of output will be 
Imr for fmil y farms since the family labour is not valued. On 
'hc contrary, if the f mily labour is also included in t h e  ccrs+, 
crlculstion then unit cost will be higher for family based 
fmtsl5. Th+refore. the small producers become marginal or cct 
hnnd very much on the valuation of the fsmiiy Iz?bour. 
Lreov*r, the bahaviour of the famtly based fans to a changlgt. in 
tk unit costs i s  also not  predictable slncc! the prociuctien is 
wt  aotivsted for profit alone. If the objective is ~ n i y  to 
produce enough for on-farm consumption, the farmersa response to 
ast increase l a  very d i f f i c u l t  to predict. In order to predict 
*imct of wage increase on output w i t h  certainty. we have. 
tkrefore, axciuded the sobslstence farmers fron the anaiysis. 
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Let OA be the maximum autput of the  c o m e r c i s 1  faraters 
that can be pmduced with the aveileble land at t h e  i n i t i a l  cost- 
price configuration. Let the price per unit of paddy A 8  @) 
which remains constantt6. Suppose the relative price of input, 
say labour, changes. In the absence cf innovat2on In the 
production teckmology . the  u n i t  cast carve w i l l  shift outwardly. 
As a result, the u n i t  cost will shift to E?. In the  new.price- 
cost situation, the fsrmer whir prodacts Cji output becomes the 
marginal producer. f.. !he producers with higher unit costa in- 
losses. These fsmers have only two options: either keep thr 
land fallow or allocate it for the best alternative use.' 11 
either case, the area under paddy declines slow with output. 
Since only better quality land that can sustain the cost incxe-• 
is put u?der paddy cultivat~oa, the  yield per acre naturallt 
goes up due to the fertility of the  s o i l  with s tat ic  technolal~. 
This provides en analytical explanation for the o b s e d  
negative association between prea and y i e l d  eli'i'sti c i t y .  This 
im3liss that the wage rate is  negatively related to  output -4 
positively to output per pcre. It I s  also w o r t h  ISentionlng that 
the renta l  value of the land under paddy reduc6s uniformly in 
such a situation. This will provide an incentive kor the farmom 
either to ahift the land t o  other profitable use& Ranever th. 
cost increase would not have any lnipact if the pr- of! paddy had 
increased to ODt per u n i t .  
Conclusion 
The wage formation i n  the rural labour market in Kerala has 
uaexamined wi th  a case study of paddy field labour u s i n g  a 
bltaneous equation model of supply and demand. Non-economic 
flirbles were inclucied ir, tk:e ~pecif :cation cf t he  s+,ructural 
quations. The estimated reduced form equn-tion shows that the 
syer a.re determined by the degr+e cf unio~isation o n l y .  In the 
dsencc of diffusion of cost, redurti ne 5 nn;rvat.i on3, mechanical as 
el! as  biological, the cost of production of paddy increases 
proportionately with wage rates.  Theref ore. the marginal land, 
ustly less fertile land, becomes unecoaornical for c u l t i v a t i o r ~  of 
pdQ without a correswnding inclwas*. irr the gutput price. The 
frners al locate.  on ly  b e t t e r  q i ia l i ty  land which can susta in  the 
cost increase. linclar such cos+, ~inimising behaviour, output and 
ma decline when wage increases. But the yield shotild go up as a 
nzult of cuitiveti~g only better quality laud. The estimated 
elasticity C J ~  outptit ax!  its compor-ents, area and yield, with 
respect to wage r a t e  supports the vaiidity of the hypothesis at 
the district 1rve.l. 
The widespreed decline I n  the profitabil ity of paddy 
cultivation has uni-L'ormlp reduced the rental value of paddy land. 
Therefore, the land oxners have an incentive for allocation of 
such land for the next best use. This may a lso  work as a 
ca ta lys t  to devel~p a land market i n  Kerala and further 
contribute to +he d e c l i n e  .in area under paddy. In such 
situation, cost reducfng innovation In production tacivloloeY is 
the only way to reverse the declining trend in paddy productie:: 
Tbe est imated regressions w i t h  thcorc t i~s l  Ly c ~ r r e c t  sign 
rd s ta t i s t i ca l iy  significant ere given below: 
Table 1. Output. Area and Yield response tc) Wage change 
I z ~ r i c t  Regression Equation 
Alleppey (i) In A = 6.2 - 8.24 Ln W 8.56  
( 3 . 1 )  ( - 3 . 3 )  
baannore (i) In A = 23.1 - G3.74 Ink'  0 .88  
( 5 8 )  ( - E . 5 )  
Xochrane-Orcutt n:at!wd: the values in the brackets arc t-ratios 
Source: 1) BSS, Season and Crop R e p o r t s  (various . i s s u e s ) .  
2) 9ZS. Scatistics for Planning (various issues). 
krbin-Watson Statistic far  Stu,~yle size less than  15 w i t h  an( 
without intercept tern for positive autocorrelation at 5% and 1: 
level are given below: 
level. of Sample R' .rrj K' =2 K' =2 
Significance s i z e  dl du dl du dl! du 
f with intercep+) (without interca?*) -. -. 
5% 12 .697 1.023 .589 1 .274 .451  1.274 
-  - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - 
Source:l) Johnson (1984),  Table 8 5 :  pp. 554-557. 
2) Parebrother (1988): pp. 1553-1563. 
The t-values for two-tailed test at 18 % and 5 x are g i ven  be1.w: 
NOTES 
See Gose 9 Raj and Tharakan (1983) and Krishnsn 
(1991 1 .  
Mstrictwise ?rrrmbershi lr. cf i k r a l a  State Karshaka Thozhilali 
Union (KSKTU). trac?c a n i a n  in spriculture controlled by 
Comunist.  Party o.f f rtcia (!!arxlat), is given in Kannan 
(1988: Tnbie e . 5 j .  
For a survey of scppiy-demciud models 3.n the Lndiul~ context. 
see 0smnr:f (138':). La: 9 ,  P.c?:srys (1989) and Jose 
... ( 1399) ernong o t h w s .  o r  a recent; exgositicln of the 
fnsticutiocal apprclacl~ ta :,h? ic.rrnot,iar, of rural wage rates 
and t h o  reisteci !.:tera+,~.ce, see ICi-2skzian (1991 ) . 
&re c n i y  t k t e  oust ir!:gort;ant models are exami~ed. A 
complete s u r v e y  ~s giver. :I.!? Lindbeck and Snower (1988; 
Chapter 2 i ilnd i l~ar~ch2lower ct. al. (1991 ). 
See Osmani t 1988 j acid Lindbesk and Snuwer ( 1988: Chapter 3 1 .  
For a simple disgrzn~atlc cxgosi+,ion of the model. Lindbeck 
and Snower i19t3d: E i ! .  
See Lindbeck and Sncwer (1988: 68) for the sources of the 
markt p c w e r  c'f the en~loyees. 
For a si3ple diagramfatic exposition of the theory, see 
Lindbcck and Snower ( 1988 ; 71 1 .  
See Ha5 and iharskan (1963: 7 8 ) .  
See i b i d .  pp. 88-63. cotes 13. 
Professcr Vsidpenathan was very cr2tical about the use of 
yield =>er acre as H proxy for labour productivity. He has 
suggaated total ngricultural lahour force as an estimate of 
actual Isbour employed in paddy prcrdluction. However, t h i s  
proxy again assume5 t h e  ratic of paddy workers to 
agriculture labour force remains constant across the 
dis tr ic ts .  
The sources of data are the follcwing: 
XI: Seasan and Crop Report and Census of India (1911, 198lj; 
li2 : Same as for XI ; 
X3: Kannan (1988:  Table 6 . 8 ) ;  
Y.4: Census Of Tnciis (1971. 1981). 
12 llle elasticity w i t h  respect to wage f ran, the m u l t i @  
regression is the inverse of the remession coafficieat.5 
the case of simple regression, the elasticity is the s u c k  
%he regressf~n coefficient. 
13 The ~rrnut.\. a r a w t h  cnt*  L n  v%alb m s r  rase m i  paddy +r 
1.1 X but tha product wage has grown about 7 . 7  par rtror 
during the period 3 375/76 -1985/56 (I(ruman and Pushpaagada; 
19W, Tabla a :  1990) .  In ths case of real wage. noaft,~ 
wage deflated by ccst of living index, Kerals has the t.h 
ItLghest wage rat-) in the country, after PunJab and Hw' 
(Crls'man, 199. Table I: A83).  
3.4 The diagram fs first introduced by Steindl ( 1976: 44). 
15 See Bharadwaj (1974: Chapter 3) for detailed discussion a 
this problem. 
16 The analysis is valid even if the price of paudy ch-. 
The only condition i s  that the price incmasct is 'Leas tk 
the cost  increase. 
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